

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 THE HA 05013 01 OF 03 090942Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
ICA-11 HA-05 MCT-02 /083 W
-----061353 091024Z /13

R 090815Z SEP 78
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3332
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 THE HAGUE 5013

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SHUM, PEPR, PINT, NL, ID
SUBJECT: THE MOLUCCANS IN THE NETHERLANDS

1. SUMMARY. PARLIAMENT'S RECENT DEBATE OF A SET OF GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS ON THE MOLUCCANS SHOWED THAT THE MOLUCCAN QUESTION IS NOT AN ISSUE OF PARTISAN POLITICAL CONTENTION; THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS WERE ADOPTED WITH MINOR CHANGES. MOLUCCAN LEADERS HERE HAVE VOICED THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S PLANS, AS EXPECTED, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE THE SELF-PROCLAIMED MOLUCCAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE OR TO HELP IN ANY OTHER WAY TO ACHIEVE MOLUCCAN INDEPENDENCE. THE PARLIAMENT STANDS FIRMLY BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT IN THIS POSITION. MOLUCCANS' HUMAN RIGHTS ARE FULLY PROTECTED AND THE GOVERNMENT PLANS TO IMPROVE THEIR EDUCATION AND WELFARE. HOWEVER, TENSION IN THE MOLUCCAN COMMUNITY CONTINUES TO BE HIGH AS A RESULT OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS; FURTHER TERRORIST ACTIONS ARE STILL A POSSIBILITY. END SUMMARY

2. BACKGROUND. IN ONE OF ITS FIRST ACTS, THE VAN AGT GOVERN-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 THE HA 05013 01 OF 03 090942Z

MENT ANNOUNCED IN JANUARY A SET OF PROPOSALS TO DEAL WITH SOME OF THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE PRESENCE IN THE NETHERLANDS OF SOME 40,000 FORMER INHABITANTS OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAN ISLANDS IN INDONESIA BROUGHT TO THE NETHERLANDS IN THE EARLY 1950S, AND THEIR DESCENDANTS. VIOLENT INCIDENTS DURING THE LAST DECADE (INCLUDING HIJACKING OF A TRAIN AND HOSTAGE-TAKING IN A SCHOOL IN 1977) HAVE FOCUSED GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ATTENTION

ON THIS MINORITY GROUP. THE ORIGINAL GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY 12,000 WAS MADE UP OF MEMBERS AND DEPENDENTS OF THE DUTCH COLONIAL ARMY WHO WANTED INDEPENDENCE FOR THEIR ISLANDS AND WHO BELIEVED THAT THE NETHERLANDS WOULD OFFER THEM NOT ONLY HAVEN, BUT ALSO SUPPORT FOR THEIR CAUSE. HOWEVER, EVERY DUTCH GOVERNMENT OVER THE YEARS HAS REFUSED TO ASSIST THEM TOWARD THEIR GOAL OF INDEPENDENCE. AS A RESULT, FRUSTRATIONS IN THE MOLUCCAN COMMUNITY HAVE GROWN AND FESTERED TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THE OFFICIALS OF THE MOLUCCAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE (RMS -- REPUBLIC OF SOUTH MOLUCCANS) CANNOT CONTROL A NUMBER OF YOUTHS WHO ATTEMPT TO USE VIOLENCE TO PRESSURE THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT INTO SUPPORTING THEIR INDEPENDENCE.

3. EARLIER, THE GOVERNMENT PAID LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE GROUP OF SHORT, DARK-SKINNED MELANESIAN PEOPLE WHO KEPT TO THEMSELVES. LARGELY BECAUSE BOTH MOLUCCAN LEADERS AND DUTCH OFFICIALS (FOR DIFFERENT REASONS) CONSIDERED THE MOLUCCANS' STAY IN THE NETHERLANDS TO BE TEMPORARY (EVEN AS LATE AS 1970), THEY WERE NOT INTEGRATED INTO DUTCH SOCIETY. THE RMS MAINTAINED STRICT IDEOLOGICAL DISCIPLINE, ENFORCED BY MOLUCCAN PARA-MILITARY UNITS WHICH WERE NOT DECLARED ILLEGAL BY THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT UNTIL 1975. A LARGE MOLUCCAN CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, BADEN PERSATUAN, ALSO SUPPORTED THE MYTH OF RMS INDEPENDENCE.

4. SEVERAL YEARS AGO THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO INJECT MONEY INTO CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPANDING
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 THE HA 05013 01 OF 03 090942Z

CONTACTS WITH THE MOLUCCAN COMMUNITY. ALTHOUGH MOLUCCAN-DUTCH ORGANIZATIONS PROLIFERATED, THERE WAS LITTLE DESIRE BY OLDER MOLUCCANS TO BE DRAWN INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF DUTCH LIFE. MOLUCCAN YOUTH WERE MORE RESPONSIVE, BUT ENCOUNTERED HEAVY CULTURAL PROBLEMS AS THEY EMERGED FROM A TIGHTLY ORGANIZED ALIEN GROUP TO UNDERTAKE POST-HIGH SCHOOL STUDIES OR TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT. THE TWO HIJACKING/HOSTAGE-TAKING INCIDENTS IN 1977 SPURRED THE GOVERNMENT INTO TAKING A MEANINGFUL LOOK AT THE MOLUCCANS AND INTO SEARCHING FOR A WAY TO BRING THEM INTO CLOSER CONTACT WITH DUTCH CULTURE.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 THE HA 05013 02 OF 03 091008Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15

ICA-11 HA-05 MCT-02 /083 W

-----061869 091020Z /12

R 090815Z SEP 78

FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3333

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 THE HAGUE 5013

5. GOVERNMENT PLANS. THE MOLUCCAN PROBLEM IS NOT A PARTISAN POLITICAL ISSUE. AFTER A RATHER PERFUNCTORY DEBATE, PARLIAMENT LAST WEEK APPROVED THE GOVERNMENT'S PLANS WITH MINOR CHANGES. TO MEET SOME OF THE MOLUCCAN GRIEVANCES, EX-SOLDIERS WILL NOW RECEIVE RETROACTIVE PENSIONS TO COVER THE PERIOD WHEN THEY WERE NOT COVERED BY DUTCH WELFARE PAYMENTS. OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, 3,000 MORE HOUSES ARE TO BE BUILT FOR MOLUCCANS. GOVERNMENT JOBS ARE TO BE PROVIDED; HELP IN FIGHTING DRUG ADDICTION, PREVALENT AMONG MOLUCCAN YOUTH, IS TO BE STEPPED UP. EXTRA FACILITIES ARE TO BE INTRODUCED TO IMPROVE MOLUCCAN EDUCATION, SUCH AS DUAL LANGUAGE TEACHING (MOLUCCANS SPEAK A FORM OF MALAY AT HOME). MOLUCCANS WILL BE GIVEN GREATER SAY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT (MOST ARE NOT DUTCH CITIZENS, AND CANNOT VOTE). THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE, WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT, TO SPONSOR ORIENTATION TRIPS TO VISIT THE SOUTH MOLUCCAN ISLANDS WHERE NETHERLANDS-BASED MOLUCCANS CAN SEE CONDITIONS FOR THEMSELVES. THE ONLY ONE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS WHICH WAS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE SECOND CHAMBER WAS A SUGGESTION FOR A JOINT DUTCH-MOLUCCAN COMMITTEE; THIS WILL NOW BE COMPOSED ONLY OF MOLUCCANS (AS THE LATTER HAD DEMANDED). (COMMENT: THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 THE HA 05013 02 OF 03 091008Z

TENOR OF THE REMARKS IN THE PARLIAMENT AND DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH SEVERAL MPS INDICATE THAT THE CHAMBER FEELS STRONGLY ABOUT STANDING FIRM ON THE MOLUCCAN ISSUE. PARLIAMENTARIANS ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO ASSIMILATE THE MOLUCCANS AND TO RELIEVE THEIR SOCIAL PROBLEMS BUT NOT TO TOLERATE ACTS OF TERRORISM OR TO COUNTERTENANCE ANY ASSISTANCE TOWARD INDEPENDENCE.)

6. MOLUCCAN REACTION. THE "PRESIDENT" OF THE RMS, JOHANNES MANUSAMA, REACTED TO THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM BY SAYING THAT HE HAD NO FAITH IN THE CABINET OF PRIME MINISTER VAN AGT.

HE VOICED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE RMS, AND AT PARLIAMENT'S DECISION NOT TO MAKE A FORMAL INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RMS IN 1950.

7. PRESS COMMENT. EDITORIAL COMMENT HAS REFLECTED THE PARLIAMENT'S SOLIDARITY WITH THE GOVERNMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, AN EDITORIAL IN THE INFLUENTIAL NRC/HANDELSBLAD OF AUGUST 31, IN WHICH MANUSAMA'S CALL FOR A PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY IS BELITTLED, CONCLUDES, "DUTCH RESPONSIBILITY WAS NOT AVOIDED, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS ONCE AGAIN MADE CLEAR THAT THE NETHERLANDS CANNOT BE A TOOL IN THE HANDS OF SOUTH MOLUCCAN POLITICS."

8. HUMAN RIGHTS. THE NETHERLANDS COULD HAVE HANDLED THE MOLUCCANS BETTER ONCE ITS ORIGINAL GOOD INTENTIONS BEGAN TO TURN SOUR OR PROVE UNREALIZABLE. THE DUTCH FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY, EXEMPLIFIED BY THEIR BRINGING SOME 12,000 EX-COLONIAL ARMY SOLDIERS AND DEPENDENTS TO THIS COUNTRY, WHICH WAS ITSELF STILL REBUILDING FROM WWII, WAS NOT MET BY A MOLUCCAN WISH TO INTEGRATE INTO DUTCH LIFE. WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE RMS HAD NO CHANCE OF CARVING OUT AN INDEPENDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 THE HA 05013 02 OF 03 091008Z

STATE FROM INDONESIA, BOTH MOLUCCAN LEADERS AND DUTCH OFFICIALS COULD HAVE WORKED MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER IN AN ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE THE CONDITION OF THE MOLUCCANS. NOW, BELATEDLY, THE GOVERNMENT IS ATTEMPTING TO BRING THE MOLUCCANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF DUTCH LIFE. MOLUCCAN LEGAL RIGHTS, WHICH ARE THE SAME AS DUTCH CITIZENS', ARE CLOSELY WATCHED BY DUTCH SOCIETY WHICH IS ALWAYS QUICK TO POINT OUT ANY LACK OF CORRECT LEGAL PROCEDURE. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT OUTCRY RECENTLY AGAINST THE RECOMMENDED EJECTION OF 182 ILLEGAL MOROCCAN WORKERS BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES THEY MIGHT ENCOUNTER IF THEY RETURNED TO MOROCCO (SEE THE HAGUE 4450), THERE HAVE BEEN NO SUCH PROTESTS IN RECENT YEARS ON BEHALF OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCANS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 THE HA 05013 03 OF 03 091028Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15

ICA-11 HA-05 MCT-02 /083 W

-----062450 091031Z /12

R 090815Z SEP 78

FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO SECSTATE 3334

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 THE HAGUE 5013

9. PROSPECTS. IF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN IMPROVING THE SITUATION OF THE MOLUCCANS AND IN GETTING AT THE CAUSES OF MOLUCCAN ACTS OF VIOLENCE, THEY MUST SOMEHOW PENETRATE THE BARRIERS THROWN UP BY THE RMS. THIS GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE CONTINUES TO KEEP ALIVE THE HOPE OF AN INDEPENDENT MOLUCCAN REPUBLIC. TO MAINTAIN UNITY, BADEN PERSATUAN PREACHES MOLUCCAN CULTURAL ISOLATION. THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT'S RECENT PUBLIC DENIAL OF THE RMS MYTH AS WELL AS ITS PROGRAMS OF IMPROVED HOUSING AND ITS "ORIENTATION" TRIPS TO INDONESIA ARE VIEWED WITH MISGIVINGS BY MANY RMS LEADERS. THE NEW HOUSING POLICY WILL BREAK UP POCKETS OF SUB-STANDARD MOLUCCAN DWELLINGS, AND (THEY FEAR) HELP DESTROY MOLUCCAN CULTURAL IDENTITY. SOME MOLUCCANS LABEL THE ORIENTATION TRIPS AS PROPAGANDA VISITS, FEARING THAT ONCE MOLUCCANS FROM THE NETHERLANDS DISCOVER THAT THE HOMELAND IS NO PARADISE, COMMITMENT TO RMS GOALS WILL DISAPPEAR.

10. NEVERTHELESS, PROGRESS ON SOME OF THE WORST PROBLEMS SEEMS A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. APPROXIMATELY 35 MILLION DOLLARS OF GOVERNMENT MONEY HAS BEEN EARMARKED FOR THE MOLUCCAN PROGRAMS RUNNING UNTIL 1983. THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 THE HA 05013 03 OF 03 091028Z

ORIENTATION VISTS TO INDONESIA HOLD SOME PROMISE. A REPORT ON A TRIP THIS SPRING BY FIVE DISTINGUISHED (RMS-ASSOCIATED) MOLUCCANS TO THE SOUTH MOLUCCAN ISLANDS TOTALLY LACKED THE STANDARD FANATICAL STATEMENTS OF COMMITMENT TO THE RMS. SOME YOUTH GROUPS ARE BEGINNING TO DISCUSS CHANGING SUPPORT FOR AN INDEPENDENT MOLUCCAS INTO PROGRAMS TO ASSIST IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR LOST ISLANDS -- WHICH, OF COURSE, MOST HAVE NEVER SEEN. WHILE RECENT STATEMENTS BY MANUSAMA CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS MAY CAUSE A CERTAIN DUTCH EXASPERATION, THE RMS LEADER WAS CERTAIN TO HAVE COME OUT IN OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN HIS COMMITMENT TO RMS IDEALS AND CULTURAL COHESION; THERE MAY, IN FACT,

BE ROOM FOR SOME TACIT GOVERNMENT-RMS COOPERATION.

11. THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE MOLUCCAN ACTS OF VIOLENCE CANNOT BE EXCLUDED. GOVERNMENT SOURCES HAVE TOLD US THAT THE PLAN FOR THE MOST RECENT TERRORIST SEIZURE (MARCH, 1978, OF A COURTHOUSE IN AASEN) WAS DRAWN UP BY A SMALL GROUP, UNCONNECTED WITH ANY OF THE LARGER VIOLENCE-PRONE MOLUCCAN GROUPS. DUTCH OFFICIALS FEAR MORE SUCH SMALL-GROUP INSTIGATED ACTIONS.

12. ASIDE FROM ITS CONNECTION WITH INDONESIA AND BENIN (ONCE CONSIDERED SYMPATHETIC TO MOLUCCAN TERRORISTS), THE MOLUCCAN PROBLEM LARGELY REMAINS ONE OF SOCIAL POLICY AND PUBLIC SAFETY FOR THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT AND DOES NOT INVOLVE INTER-STATE RELATIONS. FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DER KLAUW TOLD PARLIAMENT LAST WEEK THAT HE WOULD NOT PLEAD THE MOLUCCANS' CASE IN THE UNITED NATIONS. FOR THEIR PART, MOLUCCAN TERRORISTS HAVE FOCUSED ON PRESSURING THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT, AND NOT AMERICAN OR OTHER INSTALLATIONS OR PERSONNEL.
JOSEPH

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DEBATES, CENTRAL LEGISLATURE, MINORITIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 sep 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978THEHA05013
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780367-0903
Format: TEL
From: THE HAGUE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780984/aaaacrbm.tel
Line Count: 296
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: bc717053-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1491287
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE MOLUCCANS IN THE NETHERLANDS
TAGS: SHUM, PEPR, PINT, NL, ID
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/bc717053-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014